Did I not understand or did i overlook it .... what about building a fake positive reputation? It seems that is still possible and I did not see this mentioned as a problem or already solved concern
Building fake positive reputation is indeed a potential issue! This is likely using sybil attacks of potentially both the server & client agents, combined with collusion attacks.
What ERC-8004 currently includes though: The proposal requires mutual authorization between agents before feedback can be posted - the server agent must explicitly authorize the client to leave feedback. The validation registry uses crypto-economic staking where validators risk tokens on their assessments, and there's an option for TEE-based cryptographic proofs. These add friction and cost to fake validations.
However, coordinated collusion between the server AND client agents is possible. For example, two agents could repeatedly hire each other for minimal tasks, authorize mutual positive feedback, and gradually build "legitimate-looking" reputation. The cost would be gas fees plus validation stakes - potentially profitable for high-value services.
In particular, for sybil identity generation, the blog suggests adding a minimum bond or token burn per registration, refundable after a probation period and integrateing zk proof for uniqueness (most likely "proof-of-personhood" mechanisms). These sort of mitigation strategies are about adding friction and cost, so strategies like weighted reputation costs (prevent one entity from spamming accounts and rely on more trustworthy accounts), etc.
The blog also highlights that AcceptFeedback function lacks access control - any address can call it to emit spurious AuthFeedback events, which could pollute logs and enable oracle manipulation - I assume more of these types of vulnerabilities will be shaken out before approval and implementation of the proposal.
More research and techniques will likely be needed, unlike closed-sourced ecosystems which can build fraud detection with obscurity as part of the security, blockhain solutions will need to be robust to even knowing how the mechanism works. I suspect that's part of the "deliberately minimal" philosophy of ERC-8004 for now - it's to build up the systems and processes, and then let the innovation and research jump in to solve the problems that arise.
I'm not an expert on these sybil resistance techniques, but will be looking more closely in the near future! Let me know what you find!
Did I not understand or did i overlook it .... what about building a fake positive reputation? It seems that is still possible and I did not see this mentioned as a problem or already solved concern
Building fake positive reputation is indeed a potential issue! This is likely using sybil attacks of potentially both the server & client agents, combined with collusion attacks.
What ERC-8004 currently includes though: The proposal requires mutual authorization between agents before feedback can be posted - the server agent must explicitly authorize the client to leave feedback. The validation registry uses crypto-economic staking where validators risk tokens on their assessments, and there's an option for TEE-based cryptographic proofs. These add friction and cost to fake validations.
However, coordinated collusion between the server AND client agents is possible. For example, two agents could repeatedly hire each other for minimal tasks, authorize mutual positive feedback, and gradually build "legitimate-looking" reputation. The cost would be gas fees plus validation stakes - potentially profitable for high-value services.
Found this blog that talks about mitigations: https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/smart-contract/erc-8004
In particular, for sybil identity generation, the blog suggests adding a minimum bond or token burn per registration, refundable after a probation period and integrateing zk proof for uniqueness (most likely "proof-of-personhood" mechanisms). These sort of mitigation strategies are about adding friction and cost, so strategies like weighted reputation costs (prevent one entity from spamming accounts and rely on more trustworthy accounts), etc.
The blog also highlights that AcceptFeedback function lacks access control - any address can call it to emit spurious AuthFeedback events, which could pollute logs and enable oracle manipulation - I assume more of these types of vulnerabilities will be shaken out before approval and implementation of the proposal.
More research and techniques will likely be needed, unlike closed-sourced ecosystems which can build fraud detection with obscurity as part of the security, blockhain solutions will need to be robust to even knowing how the mechanism works. I suspect that's part of the "deliberately minimal" philosophy of ERC-8004 for now - it's to build up the systems and processes, and then let the innovation and research jump in to solve the problems that arise.
I'm not an expert on these sybil resistance techniques, but will be looking more closely in the near future! Let me know what you find!